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WHAT IS COMPUTER CRIME, AND
WHY SHOULD WE CARE?*
Michael C. Gemignani**
The heightened concern over computer crime is evidenced by the
increasing number of professional organizations which have con-
ducted studies to determine how much computer crime there really is
and who is committing it.I Even with these studies, no one is yet able
to say with any certainty how much computer crime there is and how
much of a threat it poses. Nevertheless, the federal government and
most states now have statutes which specifically address computer
abuses.2 There is also a broad array of other criminal statutes which
can be used as weapons against the computer criminal.'
There are two major reasons for the confusion surrounding com-
puter crime. One is that there is still no universally accepted defini-
* This article is based on a lecture given as part of the first Altheimer Foundation Law,
Science and Technology lecture series. The lecture was given at the University of Arkansas at
Little Rock on March 12, 1986.
** Dr. Michael C. Gemignani is currently serving as Dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences, University of Maine. He is a member of the Indiana and Maine Bars and received his
J.D., summa cum laude, from Indiana University School of Law. Dr. Gemignani has a Ph.D.
in mathematics from the University of Notre Dame and did his undergraduate work at the
University of Rochester. He was formerly Dean of the College of Sciences at Ball State
University.
1. ERNST & WHINNEY, COMPUTER FRAUD (1987) (report presented to the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting); First Annual Statistical Report of the Na-
tional Center for Computer Crime Data, COMPUTER CRIME, COMPUTER SECURITY, COM-
PUTER ETHICS (J. Bloombecker ed. 1986); TASK FORCE ON COMPUTER CRIME, A.B.A.
SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON COMPUTER CRIME (1984) [hereinafter ABA
REPORT]; R. Kusserow, Computer Related Fraud and Abuse in Government Agencies (1983)
(report ordered by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency). Donn Parker of Stan-
ford Research Institute conducted one of the earliest surveys of computer crime. It was re-
leased in 1973 as a report, Computer Abuse, co-authored by Parker, Susan Nycum and Stephen
Dura. Also, the results are summarized in D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER (1976), which
describes several early instances of computer crime.
2. Thackery, Computer-Related Crimes, An Outline, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 300, 316-17
(1985). In 1985, 36 states had computer crime statutes. Congress passed the "Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984" as a rider to a budget bill at the
end of the 98th Congress. Pub. L. No. 98-413, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190 (1984). The Act
amends chapter 47 of title 18 of the United States Code by adding a new section, § 1030, which
specifies three rather narrowly drawn categories of computer crime. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West
Supp. 1986). Other federal computer crime legislation is currently pending before Congress.
3. See, e.g., Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse, Part II: Federal
Criminal Code, 5 RUTGERS J. OF COMPUTERS & THE LAW 297 (1976).
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tion of computer crime, although some have been suggested.4 The
second is that there is no agreement concerning how much computer
crime is acutally detected, or, even if detected, what damages result
from such crime.5
The ambivalent attitude toward computer crime is exemplified
by the reluctance sometimes shown by police and prosecutors to pur-
sue the computer criminal. 6 The technology requires special exper-
tise, and preparation of a case against a suspect can be time-
consuming and tedious.7 The computer criminals often seem more
clever than dangerous, and the victims are more likely to be large
businesses or banks rather than flesh-and-blood human beings. Per-
haps nowhere, however, is the ambivalence toward computer crime
demonstrated more forcefully than in the courts. All too often indict-
ments for computer crime have been dismissed because the "crimi-
nal" act was held not to be covered by the statute under which
4. A classic work which categorizes types of computer abuse is D. PARKER, supra note 1,
at 12-22. See also, Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REv. 681 (1980).
This author believes that the term computer crime should be reserved for traditional crimes
which have acquired a new dimension or order of magnitude through the aid of a computer,
and abuses which have come into being because of computers.
5. See Gemignani, supra note 4, at 686-87. If a state computer operator deletes a friend's
DWI conviction from the files of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, then what is the value of the
loss suffered? If an offce worker illicitly copies a copyrighted program used at work for use at
home but would not have been able to afford his own copy of the program and, therefore,
would never have purchased a copy, what is the value of the damage brought about by this
crime"?
6. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 148 notes that of 148 respondents who experienced
incidents of computer crime, 50 of these did not report any of the incidents to law enforcement
agencies. Only 40 of the 148 reported all such incidents to the authorities. Id. at 21. There
were 143 respondents who took action against an identified perpetrator. The results are am-
biguous since multiple responses were allowed. No action was taken in 39 of the instances. In
49 cases, a criminal investigation was underway or completed. Prosecution began in 54 cases,
but only 15 of those cases resulted in a fine or prison term or both; 21 were still pending. What
is perhaps more remarkable is that in less than half of the cases did the employer take any
disciplinary action against the perpetrator. If prosecutors are unwilling to pursue computer
crime vigorously, employers may be even less aggressive.
7. See, e.g., the account of the case of John Thommen discussed in Gemignani, supra
note 4, at 713 (citing State v. Thommen, No. 79-424B (Crim. Ct. Marion Co., Ind. Feb. 14,
1980)). The state police officer who investigated the case spent literally hundreds of hours
collecting evidence from computer-generated logs. Id. Thommen received two years proba-
tion and a $500 fine. Jerry Schneider, who allegedly stole more than a million dollars worth of
equipment from the phone company using a computer, served forty days and paid a $500 fine.
See D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER (1976). Stanley Mark Rifkin was able to transfer
more than $10 million via computer from the Pacific National Bank to an account in New
York that he controlled. He used the money to buy more than $8 million worth of diamonds
from the Russians. He received a seven-year term but only because he tried the same trick
again while awaiting trial. For an account of the Rifkin case, see Becker, Rifkin, A Documen-
tary History, 2 COMPUTER/LAW J. 471 (1980).
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charges were brought. When this first hurdle is overcome, the
sentences imposed in successful prosecutions seem hardly to justify
the effort taken to prepare the case.' It is the former issue that I will
discuss in this article: How have courts tried to shape the nature of
computer crime by refusing to allow prosecution under statutes
which, at first reading, seem applicable? I consider first a 1985 case
from Indiana, State v. McGraw.9
Michael McGraw was a computer operator for the Indianapolis
Department of Planning and Zoning, which rented a computer from
Marion County on a flat fee basis. For his private business involving
the sale of the diet product known as NaturSlim, McGraw used the
city's computer for client lists, inventory control, copies of solicitation
letters, and other materials related to the enterprise. McGraw had no
authorization to use the computer in this way. In fact, he was repre-
manded for carrying on his private business on office time and was
later fired for refusing to stop this activity as well as for allegedly
substandard performance.
Shortly after he was fired, McGraw asked a fellow employee, an-
other computer operator, to obtain a printout of his NaturSlim data
and then to erase it from the computer's memory. Instead of comply-
ing, the operator informed his supervisor, and the resulting investiga-
tion showed the scope of McGraw's activities. The printout of the
NaturSlim data amounted to a sheaf of computer paper four to five
inches thick.
McGraw was charged with theft under the Indiana Criminal
Code section 35-43-4-2(a) which states: "A person who knowingly or
intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another
person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value
or use, commits theft, a class D felony."' 0 According to the Indiana
Code, "Property means anything of value;" and includes "[a] gain or
advantage or anything that might reasonably be regarded as such by
the beneficiary;" it also includes services."'
McGraw was convicted of theft, but the trial court granted his
post-trial motion to dismiss on the grounds that the counts against
him did not state an offense against the State of Indiana over which
the court had jurisdiction. The State appealed.
The Indiana Court of Appeals narrowed the issues to one ques-
8. See sources cited supra note 4.
9. 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. App. 1984), vacated, 480 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. 1985).
10. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2(a) (Bums 1985).
11. Id. § 35-41-1-23 (Bums 1985).
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tion: Whether the unauthorized use of another person's computer for
private business is theft under the statute as a matter of law.
McGraw argued that the word "use" does not appear in the theft
statute, which, instead, relies upon "unauthorized control." He also
noted that the definition of property does not refer to use and that the
services specifically mentioned as property concern labor rather than
electronic data processing. He maintained that he could not deprive
the city of the "use" of its computer unless "his data caused an over-
load on the computer memory banks, or that he used the computer
for his private business at a time which interfered with city's use. '" 2
Finally, he argued that the value of the services were de minimis, no
more than the value of the personal use of an office phone, calculator
or copy machine. The court of appeals, however, stated that, since it
was clear that McGraw knowingly and intentionally used the com-
puter for his own monetary gain, the only question was whether the
use of a computer was property subject to theft.1 3
The court reviewed several cases, two of which we will review
later in this article, 4 but found them inapplicable. It concluded that
McGraw's interpretation of the applicable statutes was too restrictive.
He was asking the court to accept an outdated common law notion of
larceny; modern statutes had gone beyond this notion as mandated by
modem technology. The taking of electricity and cable television ser-
vice had already been found to be grounds for a charge of theft in
Indiana. 'I5
The court of appeals found that, since computer time is some-
thing for which money is paid, it can reasonably be regarded as a
valuable asset. If a person takes such services, he exerts control over
them. Depriving the other person of any part of the services' use
without authorization completes the elements needed for theft. The
court rejected McGraw's argument that, because his use of the com-
puter did not interfere with its normal operation, his conduct was not
criminal. 6 The Indiana Supreme Court then agreed to hear the
case. 17
The Indiana Supreme Court noted that criminal statutes must be
construed strictly against the state. The theft statute did not distin-
12. 459 N.E.2d at 64.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 27-30, 33-35 and accompanying text.
15. Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972) (elec-
tricity); Moser v. State, 433 N.E.2d 68 (Ind. App. 1982) (cable television service).
16. 459 N.E.2d at 65.
17. State v. McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. 1985).
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guish between use of another's property for monetary gain and its use
otherwise, so the court could not apply that distinction.
McGraw was provided a computer terminal at his desk and com-
puter storage for his own use. The court found that, although Mc-
Graw's supervisor either knew or suspected that McGraw was using
the computer for private business, the supervisor never investigated or
reprimanded McGraw for such use, and McGraw's use was not cited
as a basis for his discharge. McGraw even received unemployment
benefits after his firing.
The court was willing to assume that McGraw's use of the com-
puter was unauthorized and that use of a computer is property. How-
ever, the harm that the theft statute attempts to prevent is depriving a
person of the use of his property; the harm is not centered in "a bene-
fit to one which, although a windfall to him, harmed nobody."18 The
central question then is not, as the court of appeals suggested, "Is
computer time subject to theft," but rather, "who was deprived of
what?" 19
The computer was leased to the city at a fixed fee. The tapes and
disks on which data were stored were erasable and reusable. The ca-
pacity of the time-sharing system was never approached so no legiti-
mate user was ever denied access to the use of the computer.
"Defendant's unauthorized use cost the City nothing and did not in-
terfere with its use by others. He extracted from the system only such
information as he had previously put into it."2 The court found no
distinction between McGraw's actions and an employee's use of a ste-
nographer's typewriter to write personal letters or the use of vacant
space on a company bookshelf to store personal belongings.
The court concluded: "[W]hen the natural and usual conse-
quences of the conduct charged and proved are not such as would
effect the wrong which the statute seeks to prevent, the intent to effect
that wrong is not so inferrable."21 Because the city was not deprived
of anything, the intent to effect a deprivation must be proved. No
such proof was offered.22 The court suggested that if McGraw was
guilty of anything, it would have been only criminal conversion,
which does not require intent "to deprive the other of any part of the
article's value or use. "23
18. Id. at 554.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 554-55.
23. Id. at 555 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-3 (Bums 1985)).
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The Indiana Supreme Court seemed to be saying that if someone
can find a way to use the property of another without inconveniencing
that person, then he or she has not committed theft. True, the court
left open the possibility of prosecution for criminal conversion, but
this sharply diminishes the seriousness of the offense. If I take your
car from the parking lot at your place of business, use it all day, and
then return it before you need it to return home, have I not stolen
your car? Certainly not under the common law notion of larceny
where I had to have the intent to deprive you of your car perma-
nently, but I would certainly have "stolen" your car under the current
Indiana Criminal Code. Or would I have? Perhaps not, according to
the Indiana Supreme Court's ruling in McGraw.
It seems, according to the Indiana Supreme Court's logic, that
whether or not one steals through unauthorized use of a computer
system depends upon accidental circumstances rather than the act it-
self. Suppose that it could be proven that McGraw's unauthorized
activities inconvenienced legitimate users of the city's computer sys-
tem in a minimal way such as by slowing response time by a small but
perceptible amount.24 Would this have been sufficient to find a depri-
vation of use? Or suppose that McGraw had erased legitimate files,
even accidentally, when he created his own illegitimate ones. Would
there then have been a deprivation? Indeed, even if McGraw had
used data from city-owned files for his private business, who would
have been deprived of anything? The files themselves would remain in
computer storage; only the information in them would have been
used. Do we then condone unauthorized taking of confidential data
because the owner of the data still has it after the taking has been
accomplished?
Can a computer system properly be compared with other tools
such as a hammer or a telephone? True, one can do mischief with a
hammer or make obscene calls with a telephone, but these devices do
not have the same power or potential for abuse as does a computer.
We do not store secret data or vast assets in our telephones, and the
damage we can do with a hammer is relatively localized and depen-
dent in large measure upon our strength and reach. Misuse of a com-
puter can cause immense damage,25 and even when damage does not,
24. The "response time" is the time that elapses between an operator's sending a com-
mand to a computer and the time the response to the command appears at the operator's
terminal. C. SIPPL, MICROCOMPUTER DICTIONARY AND GUIDE 390 (1976). If McGraw's
activity had increased response time by 0.01 of a second, then it would have taken 6000 termi-
nal transactions to cost the city one minute of work time.
25. The estimates of the overall computer losses caused by computer crime vary so widely
[Vol. 10:55
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in fact, materialize, the potential consequences of intentional misuses
are still significant.26 For a court to place a computer on a par with a
typewriter or a bookcase, as did the Indiana Supreme Court, shows a
serious misunderstanding of the power of computers and their role in
today's society.
The Commonwealth of Virginia displayed an antiquated notion
of theft in a case involving Charles Lund, a graduate student in statis-
tics, who was using the computer at Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University (VPI). 27 Lund needed to use VPI's computer, a
machine leased from IBM, in his research, but his advisor failed to
obtain an account for him. Lund used the computer anyway, charg-
ing his work to other accounts whose access codes he had obtained.
Although legitimate accounts were billed for the use of the computer,
no money actually changed hands. The billing was merely a book-
keeping device to apportion the rent paid to IBM according to how
much a department used the machine. Lund's activity was brought to
light when various users complained that unauthorized charges were
made on their accounts. Lund was confronted, and he eventually ad-
mitted his activity. He was charged with grand larceny under statutes
which required that he "obtained, by any false pretense or token,
from any person, with intent to defraud, money or other property
which may be the subject of larceny" having a value of one hundred
dollars or more.2" The director of VPI's computer center estimated
the value of what Lund had taken at more than $25,000.
Despite testimony from several faculty members, including his
department chair and thesis advisor, that the work Lund had done on
the computer was legitimate academic research and that he would
have been given a computer account had he asked for one, Lund was
as to call any estimate into serious question. An ABA Report notes published estimates be-
tween $20 million and $5 billion annually. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
26. Susan Nycum, one of the nation's most respected computer lawyers, told a Congres-
sional committee of an event that occurred when she was director of a computer center. Some-
one attempted to erase a key file directory using a telephone link to the computer. Although
an alert operator disconnected the caller before any damage was done, had the would-be van-
dal been successful, it would have cost approximately $50,000 to undo the damage. Federal
Computer Systems Protection Act: Hearings on S. 1766 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws &
Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1978). A more recent
threat has been the placement of seemingly useful programs on electronic bulletin boards; the
programs actually contain treacherous "logic bombs," see infra note 38, that can destroy a
user's data and cause other problems. This has made many people wary of using software that
is found on electronic bulletin boards or that comes from an unknown source. This, in turn,
inhibits the free flow of information among computer enthusiasts.
27. Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-178 (1982).
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convicted of grand larceny. He appealed to the Supreme Court of
Virginia.
At the time, Virginia used a common law definition of larceny,
defining it as "the taking and carrying away of the goods and chattels
of another with intent to deprive the owner of the possession thereof
permanently."29 At common law, neither services nor labor could be
the subject matter of theft since neither could be carried away. Thus,
the use of a computer was not something which could be stolen. On
the other hand, that which could be carried away, the card decks and
printouts found in Lund's possession, had value only as scrap. Even
the director of the computer center admitted they were worthless.
Thus, what Lund had taken that had value, the use of the computer,
could not be stolen, and that which had been stolen had no value.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, therefore, struck down Lund's
conviction.3 °
This case, like McGraw, poses questions about the wisdom of the
court's reasoning. Those who have studied and practiced law are re-
alistic enough to believe that judges who serve on appellate courts
sometimes reach the decision they find most acceptable to their own
inclinations and then work backward to draft an opinion to justify it.
It is easy to want to dismiss the charges against Lund since his "il-
licit" actions were related directly to his graduate work, and would
have been "licit" if he had followed the proper procedures. At most,
his actions created a minor annoyance for some computer users. But
what if Lund had been using VPI's computer for his own private busi-
ness as McGraw was doing with his employer's computer? Or, what
if Lund had been selling computer science programming assignments
to freshmen? Would the justices of the Supreme Court of Virginia
have found as they did, and would we have been satisfied with their
decision? The Virginia legislature responded to Lund by amending
the Criminal Code to make Lund's activity a crime.3 Nevertheless,
Virginia's supreme court, like Indiana's, took a position that tends to
minimize misuse of a computer system in the eyes of the law.32
Another case which provoked considerable discussion as to
29. 217 Va. at 693, 232 S.E.2d at 748.
30. Id. at 693, 232 S.E.2d at 748-49.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-98.1 (1982), repealed and replaced by Virginia Computer
Crimes Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.1 to -152.14 (Supp. 1987). See Evans v. Common-
wealth, 226 Va. 292, 308 S.E.2d 126 (1983).
32. The fact that Lund would not have had to serve a prison term even if his conviction
had been upheld, 217 Va. at 688, 232 S.E.2d at 746, does not encourage prosecutors to pursue
those who have been found to make unauthorized use of a computer system.
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whether certain computer abuses should have criminal penalties is
People v. Weg.33 Theodore Weg, a computer programmer employed
by the Board of Education of the City of New York, used the Board's
computer to keep track of the genealogy of race horses. He main-
tained that he was doing so to learn how to use a data base manage-
ment program that the Board had recently obained. There were no
allegations that he made any money from this unauthorized use of the
computer. He was charged with violating a statute which included as
theft of services:
Obtaining or having control over labor in the employ of another
person, or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facil-
ities of another person, knowing that he is not entitled to the use
thereof, and with intent to derive a commercial or other substantial
benefit for himself or a third person, he uses or diverts to the use of
himself or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities.34
Judge Juviler reviewed the history of the statute and concluded
that, based on the original purpose of the statute and its legislative
history, computers were not the industrial equipment or facilities that
the lawmakers had in mind. Computers were more in the nature of a
service. The lawmakers had specifically refused to include theft of
services in a 1967 revision of the penal law since that would have led
to hosts of criminal charges of a basically civil nature.
If "business equipment or facilities". . . had the broad mean-
ing claimed by the People and included any equipment or facilities
serving the function of the owner, the enactment of the revised Pe-
nal Law in 1967 would have made criminals of the thousands of
employees in government and the private sector who make unau-
thorized use of their employers' computers, typewriters, and other
equipment or facilities for personal benefit. The Legislature could
not have intended such a dramatic change in the criminal law...
transforming "basically civil" wrongs to misdemeanors punishable
by a year in jail without giving clearer indication of its novel
purpose.
In 1982 the Legislature could reasonably find a need to regu-
late, even by penal sanction, conduct of the type alleged in this
information. Perhaps computers are a special type of expensive,
commonly owned equipment so subject to misuse that the Legisla-
ture might wish to give their owners special protection. This court,
33. 113 N.Y. Misc. 2d 1017, 450 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1982), reprinted in I Computer L. Ser.
Rep. (Callaghan) 478 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982).
34. 450 N.Y.S.2d at 958 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(8) (McKinney Supp. 1986)).
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however, may not create an offense.35
Perhaps computers are a "special type of expensive, commonly
owned equipment so subject to misuse" that lawmakers should make
special provisions to punish misuse that might otherwise be tolerated
with respect to less powerful and potentially troublesome tools of in-
dustry and government. Courts, like that of Judge Juviler, however,
have been reluctant to rewrite the law as they see it.
3 6
Computers have given rise to new forms of vandalism that can
have serious implications for persons and businesses who depend
upon their computers. The October 21, 1985 issue of Infoworld car-
ried a story about a Southern California programmer who has been
charged with two felony counts of malicious intent to damage a com-
puter system.3 7 The charges stemmed from a "logic bomb" that the
programmer had allegedly placed in a program he wrote for Creative
Peripherals Unlimited.3 ' The bomb placed a "worm" inside the user's
operating system which counted the number of times the program
was run. When a certain number was reached, the worm changed the
data disk's identification code so that the user could no longer reach
his or her own data.39
Another form of computer vandalism is the placement of de-
structive programs on publicly accessible electronic bulletin boards.
These programs are described to the user as performing useful func-
tions, such as a screen dump, but they contain logic bombs. By the
time the user realizes the true nature of the program, substantial dam-
age has been done to his data.
There is even the threat of logic bombs placed in commerically
available programs that can damage data stored in computer systems
35. Id. at 961.
36. See also Giss v. Sumrall, 409 So. 2d 1227 (La. App. 1981) (the court rules that an
employee who was fired for using the company computer for an area real estate business he
operated on the side was entitled to unemployment compensation). A result similar to that in
Lund was obtained in People v. Home Ins. Co., 197 Colo. 260, 591 P.2d 1036 (1979) (what
was "stolen" in this case was confidential medical information).
37. Infoworld, Oct. 21, 1985, at 6, col. 4.
38. A "logic bomb" is code in software whose operation, usually highly destructive, is
triggered by the occurrence of some event. In this case the event was running the program in
which the bomb was contained a certain number of times. A typical destructive effect is eras-
ing all of the user's data stored on a hard disk.
39. A "worm" consists of instructions which infiltrate the computer's ordinary operating
instructions and which interfere, often unpredictably, with that operation. The programmer
denied that there were any intentional bugs in the program although he knew that there were
some bugs. He believed that these had been corrected. He also stated that Created Peripherals
owed him a substantial amount of money and had breached their contract with him. In-
foworld, supra note 37.
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when they detect attempts to copy the program. Such copying might
not be an attempt to violate the copyright laws but a legitimate at-
tempt by an honest user to back up a valuable investment. The owner
of the legitimate copy might not even be aware that an attempt at
copying has been made, but he or she would still have to bear the
consequences of the triggered logic bomb.
Should "booby traps" placed in computer systems be the subject
of criminal legislation, or should injured parties be allowed a remedy
only through civil actions? The threat of civil liability may not be
sufficient to deter computer vandals who may have little money with
which to pay a judgment. Also, such civil actions are expensive and
time-consuming and the requisite evidence difficult for a private party
to obtain. A logic bomb placed in a commercially distributed pro-
gram, or distributed through electronic bulletin boards, is the com-
puter equivalent of deliberately distributing tainted goods which can
cause indiscriminate injury to any person unlucky enough to ingest
the tainted goods. The economy of the nation cannot tolerate com-
puter terrorists.
The case of Tom Tcimpidis introduces another facet of computer
abuse which the law was unable to address adequately. 4 On May 16,
1984, law enforcement officers from the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment and employees of Pacific Bell Telephone swooped down on the
home of Tcimpidis, served a search warrant on the startled computer
hobbyist and electronic bulletin board operator, and carted away
computer equipment worth thousands of dollars.4" The reason for the
raid was that earlier in the month, security officers for the telephone
company had noticed that an anonymous user had posted one AT&T
and two Sprint long-distance codes with instructions to "enjoy."
Tcimpidis was charged with telephone fraud, a misdemeanor for
which convictions can carry a penalty of up to a year in prison and a
$10,000 fine. A lawyer and computer hobbyist, Charles Lindner,
agreed to defend Tcimpidis for out-of-pocket expenses alone; and
these expenses were to be met by contributions from other outraged
computer users.
40. For an excellent account of the Tcimpidis case, see Watt, Use a Modem - Go to Jail?,
Profiles, February 1985, at 28.
41. An electronic bulletin board system of the type that Tcimpidis operated consists of a
hard disk, a modem, a microcomputer, and appropriate software. A user accesses the system
by dialing a particular telephone number; the connection is made over a telephone line using
the modem. The user is then free to post messages on the bulletin board by creating a new file,
or adding to an existing file, on the hard disk. The user can obtain messages from the board by
reading files stored on the hard disk.
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There is no doubt that someone placed illicit data on Tcimpidis'
bulletin board. At the time, the bulletin board was available to any-
one who had the telephone number and the necessary equipment. In
the approximately four years of operation before the "bust," hundreds
of callers had left nearly 100,000 messages. The sheer volume of
messages, coupled with the fact that the board was Tcimpidis' hobby
and not his livelihood, was almost certain evidence that he had no
knowledge of the illicit message which gave the long-distance access
codes. It is probably this consideration that finally led the prosecutor
to drop the charges, because if Tcimpidis did not know about the
presence of the message, he could not have been found guilty.
An interesting aspect of the law under which Tcimpidis was
charged is that it did not require proof of any loss on the part of the
telephone company or anyone else. It did not even require that the
telephone credit card number be real. Anyone could be charged who
published
the number or code of an existing, canceled, revoked, expired or
nonexistent credit card, or the numbering or coding which is em-
ployed in the issuance of credit cards, with the intent that it be
used or with knowledge or reason to believe that it will be used to
avoid the payment of any lawful telephone or telegraph toll
charge.42
The Tcimpidis incident raises the question of the extent to which
computer system operators should be held accountable for illicit ac-
tivity conducted on their systems. It also raises constitutional ques-
tions concerning the right of free speech. To place severe constraints
on those who operate means of communications like electronic bulle-
tin boards, which are becoming increasingly popular as methods of
information interchange, risks the proverbial "chilling effect" that
may hamper first amendment rights.43
The primary issue raised by the selection of cases reviewed in this
article is this: What computer-related acts are so dangerous to the
public welfare that society should punish, through its system of crimi-
nal justice, those who commit them? How seriously should we view
attempts by "hackers" to break into the computer systems of hospi-
tals, businesses, and even defense establishments? Many of these se-
curity breaches come from inadequate safeguards at the break-in site;
at times, employees of the computer operations themselves provide
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.7(c) (West Supp. 1986).
43. A major issue, yet to be settled, is whether computer bulletin boards have the first
amendment rights of newspapers, the rights of public broadcasters, or the rights of neither.
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the necessary information for compromising the system. To what ex-
tent should we punish someone who provides the information needed
to commit a crime, knowing that others will then use this information
to commit it? There is at least one underground newspaper dedicated
to providing information to defraud the phone company."
The Tcimpidis incident raises issues of free speech and open com-
munications. How many controls should the government be permit-
ted to impose on data flow in the name of stifling abuses? To what
extent should computer operators be held responsible for illicit activ-
ity carried out on their system? Too much government monitoring
can easily lead to stifling information flow, and too little can pose a
serious threat to the national government with weapons against legiti-
mate dissent, but laws or courts that are too lenient can create an
environment that encourages computer thieves to try their luck at
will.
Should we punish someone for the unauthorized use of his or her
employer's computer? Should the answer to this important question
be determined by the activity carried out on the machine, and, if so,
what activity should be punished? Is the computer substantially dif-
ferent from the telephone and the hammer as a tool in modern soci-
ety, and, if so, how does this translate into law?
There is no question that new legislation is needed to address the
issues that computer use raises; but, the kind of legislation that would
most favor our societal goals is far from obvious. If the law fails to
address the issues intelligently now, we may find that we have lost the
opportunity to address them at all, later.
44. The newspaper is appropriately named TAPS. Now electronic bulletin boards can
serve the same function as underground newspapers, as the Tcimpidis incident illustrates.
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